I INTRODUCTION
This article considers how policymakers might provide an appropriate regulator with powers over providers of electronic money or 'e-money' in the event those providers experience financial distress. Where a bank begins to experience financial distress, there is generally statutory provision for 'resolution powers' 1 which enable a responsible authority ('the resolution authority') to intervene to facilitate the orderly winding down of the bank, thereby mitigating losses and averting more severe systemic disruption. 2 However, these resolution powers generally apply only to institutions that conduct 'banking business' (defined in terms of accepting deposits and financial intermediation) and do not extend to non-bank e-money providers, even though the failure of a large provider could cause major disruption to the economies of a few nations. 3 In recent years, e-money has experienced substantial growth in a number of countries, gaining particular importance for some nations that have historically relied heavily on costly cash transfers and suffered from low levels of financial inclusion. 4 In simple terms, e-money is monetary value stored electronically These powers permit the resolution authority to avert more serious systemic disruption, but do not generally extend to Providers.
To be sure, e-money services currently pose significantly less systemic risk than banking and other financial services, given that, even where they are widely used, they account for a very small percentage of the total value of funds in accounts and electronic payments in a country. 12 Nonetheless, the failure of a large Provider could cause major disruption to a nation's economy -including financial losses and the disruption of trade and government payments -as well as posing a reputational risk to the relevant regulator, 13 and potentially undermining consumer confidence in e-money services and electronic payment instruments, and possibly in the financial system more generally. 14 This article considers how policymakers might provide a relevant regulator with resolution powers over Providers to respond to these risks. We propose that this can be achieved by legislative amendment or, where there are obstacles to such amendment, by non-legislative means, either by the imposition of conditions on the grant of an e-money licence or (to more limited effect) by the appointment of the regulator or its nominee as a 'protector' under the e-money trust where that instrument is used.
Given that our proposal is intended to be applicable across various jurisdictions, we present high-level policy options rather than suggesting any specific drafting or statutory amendments. Any legislative response would necessarily take into account the context of the particular jurisdiction. To the extent that our proposal makes recommendations in respect of trust-based solutions, it is also generally limited to jurisdictions with a common law tradition and established trust law. We do note that many countries with a non-common law tradition also have laws on trust arrangements, which can achieve similar outcomes while operating differently to common law trusts. 15 Our proposals may also be relevant in these jurisdictions, depending on the terms of the particular trust law.
This article proceeds as follows. Part II explains the significance of e-money and Providers, especially in the context of financial inclusion objectives for developing countries. Part III defines 'e-money' in more detail and explains the process by which e-money is issued, used and redeemed, and risks in the issuance of e-money. Part IV outlines the features of e-money regulations passed in a number of jurisdictions to promote the security of these services, as well as the general absence of regulatory measures to address the financial distress of a Provider. Part V explains legislation in various jurisdictions which provide resolution authorities with resolution powers in respect of banks and financial institutions in both developed and developing countries. Part VI proposes a legislative approach to providing resolution powers in respect of Providers, by 12 See Part VI below. 13 Fung, Molico and Stuber, above n 5, 2, 15. the amendment of existing resolution powers legislation or by the amendment of specific e-money regulation. Recognising the impediments to legislative reform in many countries, Part VII puts forward non-legislative approaches, including the imposition of conditions on the grant of e-money licences and the appointment of the resolution authority or its nominee as a 'protector' under the e-money trust, although we consider the latter to be less desirable due to the limited powers it provides.
II THE SIGNIFICANCE OF E-MONEY AND PROVIDERS
In the last two decades, e-money has experienced tremendous growth in a number of markets, particularly in some countries with cash-intensive economies in East Asia, Africa and Europe.
16 By 2015, the Global System for Mobile Communications ('GSMA') reported that e-money was available in 93 countries, with 134 million active e-money accounts and issuers processing an average of 33 million transactions per day.
17
While e-money is issued by both banks and Providers, Providers often have the advantage of a substantial existing customer base and networks, providing a large number of potential users of, and channels for marketing, e-money. 18 The offer of e-money as an additional service can increase the attractiveness of the Provider's core services, while the Provider's expertise in the provision of those services may allow it to find new markets and to innovate in ways banks have not.
19
The increasing availability of e-money has been especially important in improving access to financial services in some developing countries, 20 where people are more likely to have a mobile phone than a bank account. 21 The GSMA reported that in 19 markets there were more e-money accounts than bank accounts. 22 In addition to the lift in financial inclusion provided by these e-money accounts, in the words of the BIS, 'some of these products may help individuals in getting acquainted with more sophisticated financial products, thus potentially contributing to financial inclusion'. 23 Governments have also encouraged the growth of e-money as an efficient alternative to cash (especially where there are 16 Fung, Molico and Stuber, above n 5, 4-5. substantial costs and risks in the transport and holding of cash), as a measure to reduce levels of corruption in government to person payments, and as a source of competition for more traditional electronic retail payment instruments.
24
The combination of these opportunities to improve financial inclusion and the competitive advantages offered by Providers explain the concern of governments to ensure that regulation of this activity promotes consumer confidence, the security of the service, and broader financial stability, without unnecessarily stifling rivalry and innovation.
25

III E-MONEY: DEFINITION, PROCESS AND RISKS
E-money may be defined as electronically stored 26 monetary value represented by a claim on the issuer, 27 which is issued on receipt of funds for the purpose of making payment transactions and which is accepted as a means of payment by persons other than the issuer. 28 Important features of this definition are that e-money is monetary value (and not, for example, a means of accessing funds in a credit or savings account with a bank), that the value can be used to pay for goods or services from suppliers other than the issuer (as opposed to mobile airtime or transport credit which can only be used on one network, for example), and that the value can be redeemed for cash.
The mechanics of e-money issuance by an issuer are as follows. Customers transfer funds or pay cash to the issuer (sometimes via an agent). The corresponding value in e-money is stored on a card, mobile phone, hard drive or other electronic device. The stored value may be used to purchase goods and services, pay bills and transfer value to others, depending on the scope of the product. Some governments have also adopted the policy of making payments to citizens in e-money, partly to expand and encourage use of these services, and partly to reduce the opportunities that abound for 'leakage' of government-to-citizen payments in a paper-based payments system with often illiterate recipients. 29 The e-money issuer has an obligation to redeem e-money, that is, to pay its equivalent in cash, upon the demand of the e-money holder. The e-money holder may be the original purchaser of the e-money or a subsequent transferee of the emoney.
The aggregate of funds an e-money issuer receives from customers in exchange for the issue of e-money is known as the 'float'. 30 Crucial to any emoney business is that the funds in the float at any given time should equal the emoney in circulation (which will be the total amount of e-money issued by the issuer less the e-money which has been redeemed), so that all requests for redemption by e-money holders can be honoured. Using the classification of risks put forward by Greenacre and Buckley, there are three main threats to the emoney float and thus the security of e-money customers' funds, namely: that the issuer may have insufficient liquid assets to meet customers' demands for cash ('illiquidity risk'); that the issuer may become insolvent such that customers will be unable to redeem their e-money at all or in full ('insolvency risk'); and that customers' funds may be lost through fraud, theft or negligence ('operational risk').
31
These risks are more pronounced due to two features of e-money in particular. First, Providers are not subject to the same supervision and prudential regulations that apply to banks and other financial institutions. 32 Second, and related to this feature, the funds an e-money issuer receives from a customer in exchange for the issue of e-money are not a 'deposit' and are therefore rarely covered by deposit insurance schemes.
33
From the customer's perspective, in the absence of a regulatory solution, these features may make e-money a less secure option than a traditional savings account or, to some minds, holding cash. See, eg, Stuart, above n 29, on Colombian customers' reluctance to leave e-money in their 'm-wallet' and the perceived security of withdrawing the cash amount instead: at 12-15.
passed specific e-money regulations to improve the security of e-money services, and particularly to protect the e-money float. 35
IV PROTECTING THE E-MONEY FLOAT: E-MONEY REGULATIONS
E-money regulations generally establish a licensing or authorisation regime to ensure that issuers meet certain threshold standards -for example, with respect to security measures and capital requirements -before they commence e-money operations. 36 They also provide for the protection of the float, for instance, by setting minimum liquidity requirements, obligations regarding the use of agents, and restrictions on the use and investment of funds in the float.
37
In countries with a common law tradition in particular, policymakers have used trust law as part of the regulation of e-money to avert the risks associated with the issuance of e-money. 38 Providers receiving customer funds in exchange for issuing e-money may be required by regulation to deposit those funds in a trust account.
39
The trustee of these funds may be the Provider itself or sometimes a bank or a professional trustee. The intention is that requiring the float to be held on trust will ensure that e-money customers' funds are kept separate from the Provider's own funds and from the funds of its other businesses so that e-money holders will be able redeem their e-money for cash at any time.
The key benefit of the common law trust for these purposes is that it creates a legally recognised segregation of property, imposing obligations on the trustee to use the trust property (in this case, the float) for the benefit of the beneficiaries of the trust (the e-money holders) alone, as well as removing or reducing the risk that the float will be subject to claims by other creditors if the Provider or trustee becomes insolvent. The trust imposes obligations on the Provider, or other trustee, to keep emoney customers' funds strictly separate from the funds of its other businesses. The regulated terms of the trust instrument may provide further protection by requiring that the customer funds only be invested in certain safe and liquid investments, such as commercial bank deposits and low-risk government securities, 41 and that the Provider deliver audited financial statements for the trust to the regulator. 42 In this way, e-money regulations often provide significant protection against the three risks to the e-money float identified earlier, namely illiquidity risk, insolvency risk and operational risk. 43 These regulations, however, do not tend to address the broader consequences of a Provider becoming insolvent or experiencing financial distress prior to insolvency. If a regulator forms the opinion that the Provider has breached the e-money regulation or is not operating in the interests of the public, the regulator frequently has the power to withdraw or cancel a Provider's e-money licence or approval, 44 or impose sanctions on the Provider. 45 However, these measures, in themselves, do not address the potential economy-wide disruption which may result from the abrupt withdrawal of the Provider's e-money service.
In the following parts, we first describe resolution regimes put in place in various jurisdictions to provide for the orderly winding down of distressed banks and other financial institutions. We then outline the case for similar powers to be granted to the resolution authority in respect of Providers that issue e-money.
V RESOLUTION POWERS: BANKS AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
A Introduction to Resolution Powers In the case of banks and other financial institutions, statutory powers are often granted to a resolution authority or authorities to take steps to ensure the orderly 'resolution' of the institution if it 'is no longer viable or likely to be no longer viable, and has no reasonable prospect of becoming so'. 46 Described as 'triage for financial institutions after they experience problems', 47 resolution powers aim to enable authorities to address the liquidity and solvency problems of financial institutions through early intervention, while protecting the savings 41 Grossman, above n 31, 9. of deposit holders, minimising systemic disruptions and promoting market efficiency. 48 The resolution authority is often the main banking supervisor, but that supervisor may be required to consult with other authorities before exercising resolution powers or resolution powers may be shared between more than one authority.
49
A special resolution regime is usually considered necessary for banks and financial institutions since normal protracted insolvency proceedings would give rise to unacceptable risks to financial stability and interruptions in critical services. 50 When such an institution is in financial distress, resolution authorities must often act very quickly to avoid losses in the value of the firm, disruption to the institution's services, and a rapid loss of customer confidence which could lead to a run on deposits and contagion effects for other institutions. 51 A typical situation involves the resolution authority and other relevant authorities holding urgent meetings over the course of a weekend to determine how the institution's operations, assets and liabilities should be held and managed, and then announcing the solution before the market opens the following Monday. Banking Supervision, 55 and the FSB have each made recommendations in this regard. 56 According to the FSB, a resolution regime 'should allow authorities to resolve financial institutions in an orderly manner without taxpayer exposure to loss from solvency support, while maintaining continuity of their vital economic functions'. 57 The FSB has recommended a range of resolution powers to G20 nations which would apply to 'any financial institution that could be systemically significant or critical in the event of failure'.
58 Systemic risk can be defined as the risk that 'the failure of one … institution causes related institutions to fail, harming the entire market or entire market segment and the economy as a whole'.
59
The resolution powers recommended by the FSB to G20 countries include, in broad terms, the power to:
remove and replace the senior management and directors; appoint an administrator to take control of and manage the affected firm; operate and resolve the firm, including powers to terminate contracts, continue or assign contracts, purchase or sell assets and write down debt; override rights of shareholders of the firm in resolution, including requirements for approval by shareholders of particular transactions; transfer or sell assets and liabilities, legal rights and obligations, including deposit liabilities and ownership in shares, to a solvent third party; establish a temporary bridge institution to take over and continue operating certain critical functions and viable operations of a failed firm; impose a moratorium with a suspension of payments to unsecured creditors and customers; and effect the closure and orderly wind-down (liquidation) of the whole or part of a failing firm with timely payout or transfer of insured deposits and prompt access to transaction accounts and to segregated client funds.
60
In a number of G20 countries, legislated resolution powers are now extensive, including the various powers listed above. 61 
55
Basel A well-known approach to the exercise of such resolution powers is the 'good bank'/'bad bank' split in which the distressed or 'bad' assets of the institution are transferred to a separate entity to be liquidated or sold to 'vulture fund' managers, allowing the institution or another entity to focus on the 'good' assets and operations, minimising disruption to important services. 62 For example, in 2008, UBS and Swiss authorities arranged for UBS's 'toxic' assets to be transferred to a special purpose vehicle set up by the Swiss National Bank, while the good assets continued to be operated and managed by UBS.
63
C Resolution Powers in Developing Countries
The laws of many developing countries also grant resolution powers to the central bank or similar regulator, 64 although they tend not to have been the subject of the same post-GFC reform efforts or be as detailed as those in G20 nations. These resolution powers are generally triggered when the institution becomes insolvent or is likely to become insolvent, or when it is unable or likely to become unable to meet its obligations. 65 In particular, the powers are triggered if the institution notifies the resolution authority of its predicament, or an audit report required under the legislation provides this notice, or the resolution authority itself forms the opinion that such a state of affairs has arisen. 66 The powers tend not to be limited to systemically significant, or systemically important, institutions, but apply to all banks or financial institutions.
Resolution powers in these countries commonly include the power to: direct the institution to take certain actions or refrain from taking certain actions; 67 appoint an advisor to advise the institution on the proper operation of its business; 68 appoint the resolution authority itself, or a nominee of the authority, to act as the controller or statutory manager of the institution with the power to operate the business of the institution; apply to the court for the winding up of the institution. 70 The resolution authority's powers in this respect tend to be limited to institutions conducting a 'banking business', which is generally defined in terms of financial intermediation. 71 Thus the resolution powers do not extend to Providers. The authority typically could not, for example, exercise its resolution powers in respect of a mobile network operator if its e-money business became illiquid or showed other signs of failing.
VI A CASE FOR LEGISLATED RESOLUTION POWERS IN RESPECT OF E-MONEY PROVIDERS
It is generally accepted that e-money services pose less systemic risk to the financial sector than banking and other payment systems.
72
Di Castri has pointed out that e-money services are not subject to the same regulation as Systemically Important Payment Systems ('SIPS') because 'it is believed that they would not endanger the rest of the economy if they failed'.
73
He gave the example that, as at 2010, even M-PESA, the world's largest e-money deployment, represented just 0.2 per cent of bank deposits by value, and 2.3 per cent of electronic transactions by value, in Kenya. 74 Nonetheless the failure of a large Provider could cause major disruption to a nation's economy. 75 For example, although M-PESA represents a small percentage of the value of bank deposits and the value of transactions, M-PESA transactions account for around 70 per cent of all electronic transactions in Kenya. 76 The failure of such a significant Provider of an essential service could significantly disrupt trade and government payments if its services are used for government-to-person ('G2P') payments.
77
Although e-money transaction values are typically small relative to the total of all transactions, financial losses would also be significant for individual 69 See, eg, Banking Act (Kenya) s 34 (2) households, particularly vulnerable low-income households, if a substantial portion of the household's assets are held in e-money. 78 Such events are likely to undermine consumer confidence in e-money services and electronic payment instruments more generally and may affect confidence in the financial system more broadly, working against objectives of financial inclusion and the adoption of efficient financial services. In countries where the use of e-money is relatively limited, there may be little or no contagion effect for other payment systems if a Provider fails. However, in countries where e-money services are pervasive, and part of the fabric of the broader financial system, the distress or demise of a large Provider could cause significant contagion effects, conceivably in an extreme case leading to a run on deposits on banks and financial institutions.
79
There is also considerable reputational risk to the relevant regulator if a Provider fails. 80 Fung et al point out that there may be harm to the reputation of a regulator 'perceived to be responsible for the well-being of the financial system and for public confidence', noting that '[g]lobally, there seems to be an increased public expectation for central banks to prevent disruptions and defaults of major retail payments systems'.
81
This risk is likely to be heightened in emerging economies if the regulator plays an active role in promoting access to financial services, including relatively new digital financial services, as many developing country central banks do, in seeking to discharge their financial inclusion mandate.
Given the real risks posed by the collapse or uncertain viability of a significant Provider, there is a case for the amendment of existing legislation which grants resolution powers in respect of financial institutions, to expand these powers to cover any entity that provides e-money. In this way, the resolution authority would have the same tools available, and follow the same processes, if a Provider begins to experience financial difficulties as for a bank or financial institution.
Alternatively, these powers could be granted under the specific e-money regulation. The amendment of such regulations, as subsidiary legislation, is likely to be less complex and lengthy than the amendment of a statute granting resolution powers. The grant of resolution powers under e-money regulation also allows policymakers to tailor these powers to the context of e-money or payment service providers. Kenya provides a rare example of the government taking this course. The National Payment System Regulations 2014 (Kenya) grant resolution-style powers to the Central Bank of Kenya ('CBK') in respect of payment service 78 See Tanai providers, which include e-money providers. 82 The Regulations provide that CBK 'may, by notice to an authorized payment service provider, suspend an authorization for such period as the Bank may specify or revoke an authorization' in a number of circumstances, including where the authorised payment service provider:
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(f) becomes insolvent or is unable to effectively conduct its operations; (g) through its activities, the public trust is compromised; … (k) has a winding-up order made against it or a resolution for voluntary winding passed against it; … (o) fails to ensure that the trust account is managed in a manner consistent with Trust legislation and this regulation; …
The Regulations go on to provide the CBK 'shall, upon revoking or suspending an authorisation under this regulation … take over control of the business of the payment service provider to safeguard and facilitate distribution of the money in the Trust Fund'.
84
According to the wording of the regulation, this is not a mere discretion granted to CBK. Rather, CBK has an obligation to take control of the business where it has revoked or suspended the payment service provider's authorisation.
In these circumstances, CBK shall also, inter alia, 'notify the institution holding the Trust funds to cease forthwith further dealing with the funds until the institution receives directions from [CBK]'. 85 Further, CBK may 'appoint any person, including another payment service provider, to distribute the balances held in the Trust Fund of the revoked payment service provider at the time of revocation'.
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These regulations demonstrate how resolution powers can be adapted to the specific context of the e-money sector under e-money regulations. For example, it is possible for such regulations or guidelines to make specific provision for actions to be taken in respect of the e-money trust (where this forms part of the emoney regulation) and the trustees of that trust.
Resolution regimes frequently include the power for the resolution authority or its nominee to take control of the business of the failing institution. However, if the authority were to take control of a Provider, there may be significant ramifications for other markets or sectors in which the Provider operates and for the regulators which supervise those activities.
87
For instance, the telecommunications regulator would probably be seriously concerned about a central bank taking control of the business of a significant telecommunications company.
One solution to this problem is to routinely require Providers to incorporate a subsidiary which engages solely in the e-money business, such that actions taken by the resolution authority in respect of the subsidiary would not directly affect the other parts of the business of the Provider. Some e-money regulations already require an e-money business to be conducted by a separate entity incorporated solely for the purpose of providing e-money. 88 We strongly recommend this approach (i) to limit regulatory overlap, (ii) to aid in ring-fencing the e-money business from other businesses and liabilities of the Provider in the event of insolvency, and (iii) to aid the efficient application of resolution powers.
VII NON-LEGISLATIVE APPROACHES A Conditions Imposed on E-Money Licence or Approval
In some jurisdictions, there may be resistance to the amendment of the resolution powers legislation or to the e-money regulation in this respect, particularly given that Providers -for example, telecommunications companiesmay already be subject to comprehensive regulation by another regulator. Even where legislative change is possible, its negotiation and passage into law could be a lengthy process.
E-money regulations often provide that the regulator may impose conditions on, or set terms for, the grant of an e-money licence, registration or approval.
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In the absence of legislative provision for resolution powers in respect of Providers, it may be possible for the resolution authority, or its nominee, to be given similar powers by incorporating them into the e-money licence or approval.
B Appointment of a 'Protector' under the E-Money Trust
In other cases, it may not be practical or possible to amend either the resolution powers legislation or e-money regulation, or to impose conditions on an e-money licence or approval. In Fiji, for example, there is no specific e-money regulation or guideline. Rather, the two e-money providers have signed a 'Trust Deed Instrument' with the Reserve Bank of Fiji under which the Providers 'undertake to hold customers' funds in trust and also commit to other safeguards such as the establishment of a Trust Fund with strict rules to govern its operations '. 90 In the absence of a legislative amendment or the imposition of conditions on an e-money licence or approval, we propose that the regulator may be provided with resolution-style powers as a 'protector' under an e-money trust deed, although, as explained below, these powers would necessarily be narrower than the resolution powers outlined earlier. This approach would also be limited to 88 See, eg, 'Guidelines on the Issuance of E-Money', above n 33, s 5(B); Bank of Ghana, above n 39, art 7(4)(e); Electronic Money Regulations 2015 (Tanzania) reg 12. Cf National Payment System Regulations 2014 (Kenya) reg 25(2) which only require the Provider to establish a separate 'business unit' with a separate 'management structure' and account-keeping. 89 See, eg, Bank of Ghana, above n 39, art 7(4)(h); Bank of Uganda, above n 42, art 6(d). Cf Electronic Money Regulations 2015 (Tanzania) which seem not to provide for the regulator to impose conditions on the grant of an approval. 90
Reserve Bank of Fiji, above n 4.
those jurisdictions with an established law of trusts, where Providers can be required to place the e-money float in a trust account. 91 A trust is an equitable obligation imposed on the legal owner of the trust property ('the trustee') to hold that property for the benefit of another person ('the beneficiary'). 92 Although the trustee is the legal owner of the trust property, the trustee's interest is a bare legal estate and the trustee is not permitted to use the trust property for its own purposes. 93 Beneficial ownership of the trust property rests with the beneficiary and equity will uphold the beneficiary's interest in that property against the trustee and almost everyone else in the world. 94 The 'settlor' is the person who creates the trust by manifesting the intention that the trust is intended in favour of the beneficiary, usually by executing a trust deed.
The 'protector' is a further role in trust law, although most trusts do not involve a protector. While there are statutory definitions of the term 'protector' in some jurisdictions, 95 there is no consensus on the definition of the term at common law. Commentators have defined a trust protector as 'a person who is not a trustee but who holds powers under the terms of a trust instrument not entirely for his own benefit', 96 or 'the holder of one or more powers capable of affecting what the trustees are to do with the trust property'. 97 A protector may be a person or corporation who the settlor knows and trusts, and to whom the settlor grants powers over the trustee. These powers commonly include the power to remove and appoint trustees, to veto decisions of the trustee, to direct trustee decisions about distributions to beneficiaries under the trustee, or to advise the trustee on how to invest the assets of the trust. 98 But this list is not exhaustive. In the absence of legislation, 99 settlors are free to determine the powers given to a protector under the trust instrument. 100 In the present context, we propose that the resolution authority, or its nominee, may be appointed as a protector under the trust instrument of an emoney trust. To date, protectors have tended to be drawn from the ranks of a settlor's trusted friends or family, or from professional trustee companies, legal firms or accounting firms; we are not aware of any case in which a regulator has been appointed to this role. However, the categories of person who may act as a protector are not closed and, in the absence of statutory provision, there is no legal impediment to a resolution authority acting as a protector. The settlor's choice of protector is only limited to 'those who are qualified to undertake the responsibilities of the position, and within that group, those who are willing to serve'. 101 Hubbard lists a wide range of persons who may be appointed to this role, including 'a corporation or other entity recognized as having legal personality under the law of the settlement'. 102 A statutory body will have legal personality if it is capable of suing and being sued, as determined by the statute under which the body is constituted.
In the absence of legislative provision to the contrary, the settlor is entitled to grant whatever powers it desires to a protector under the trust deed.
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The protector could be granted powers in respect of the trust in which the e-money float is held, including the power to: direct the trustee to take certain actions or refrain from taking certain actions in respect of the trust property -that is, the float -including directions as to where and how the funds should be invested; appoint an advisor to advise the trustee on the proper operation of the trust or the management of the e-money float; remove the trustee and appoint a new trustee; make distributions to the beneficiaries of the trust, that is, the e-money holders; and terminate the trust. Whether any of these powers conflict with the insolvency laws of the relevant jurisdiction will need to be investigated.
Such protector powers may provide the resolution authority or its nominee with the ability to exercise prompt and effective control over the e-money float where the Provider is in financial distress, reducing illiquidity risk. However, a protector under an e-money trust deed could not be granted resolution powers which precisely align with those commonly granted to a resolution authority in respect of failing banks or financial institutions since these resolution regimes generally give the regulator power over the institution itself and its business. In the case of an e-money trust, only the float is held in trust. The Provider and its prohibition or rule of equity, the trust deed should be able to validly limit the protector's liability for any breach of duty to cases of fraud or wilful misconduct.
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Alternatively, the protector's obligations may be altered by statute, either by providing that a protector is not a fiduciary, or by establishing the default position that a protector is not a fiduciary unless the parties specify otherwise in the deed, 112 or by limiting the extent of fiduciary obligations owed by a protector. It is possible, for example, to legislate to limit the protector's fiduciary obligations to the duty to exercise its powers under the trust instrument in good faith, or to exclude liability to beneficiaries for 'a bona fide exercise of a power'.
113
VIII CONCLUSION
E-money has shown great promise as an efficient means of making payments and transferring funds and as an aid to improving financial inclusion in developing countries. Providers have played a key role in the growth of e-money in a number of countries and policymakers have tailored regulatory solutions to address the risks inherent in the issuance of e-money by Providers. While these regulations tend to provide for the sanctioning of Providers or the revocation of their authorisation in the event of Provider misconduct, there is, beyond Kenya, generally no provision for a resolution authority to take measures to ensure the orderly resolution of a Provider that experiences financial distress. We propose that there may be relatively simple solutions available to policymakers to fill this 'gap' in e-money regulation. This may be achieved by legislative amendment or, where there are obstacles to such amendment, by non-legislative means, including by the imposition of conditions on the grant of an e-money licence or (to more limited effect) by the appointment of the regulator or its nominee as a 'protector' under the e-money trust with specific powers conferred upon it in the event of the Provider encountering difficulties.
that the settlor can negate the protector's fiduciary duty': at 1133. Cf Hubbard, above n 96, seems to consider that, in jurisdictions which base their trust law on English law, if a protector holds its power in a fiduciary capacity, liability for fraud and willful misconduct may not be excluded: at 166-7. 111 See Hubbard, above n 96, 166-7; Bove, above n 97, 88-9. See also Frolik, above n 98, arguing that the trust deed may specifically 'provide that an act of ordinary negligence does not violate good faith', but that a settlor could not exculpate a protector from liability from acts in bad faith or with reckless indifference: at 292. 112 See, eg, Hubbard, above n 96, 167, citing Trusts (Guernsey) Law 2007 s 15(2)(b). 113 Hodson, above n 103, 11 with reference to the British Virgin Islands and the Bahamas.
